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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most heated battles raging in the federal district and circuit courts
concerns the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the use of this statute by abortion
clinics against Operation Rescue's blockades. Operation Rescue is a pro-life
organization that engages in civil disobedience by using the bodies of its
members to block the entrances to abortion clinics. 1 Their stated purpose is to

1Operation Rescue was founded in 1987 by Randall Terry. Within two years, behind
Terry's leadership, Operation Rescue grew to 35,000 members in 200 cities. By 1989,
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"rescue"2 the lives of the unborn children who would otherwise be aborted at
the clinics on the days they are blockaded. 3 In response, some of the clinics are
attempting to stop the blockades by seeking federal remedies against the
"rescuers" under § 1985(3).4
Section 1985(3) provides for civil liability for conspiracies with the intent to
deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection... or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws."5 In Griffin v. Breckenridge,6 the
Supreme Court interpreted this language as requiring a "racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus"7 as the motivation
behind the conspiracy. Unfortunately, the Griffin Court's use of the phrase
"perhaps otherwise class-based" has created much uncertainty in the lower
courts concerning the scope of § 1985(3) and whether the statute applies to
invidious discrimination against class-based groups other than racial groups.8
The Court subsequently addressed the scope of § 1985(3) in two cases: Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny 9 and United Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners v. Scott.10 These decisions resolved some issues regarding the scope

Operation Rescue had already logged 250 "rescues" and 22,000 arrests. Sue Hutchison
& James N. Baker, The Right-to-Life Shock Troops, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 32.
Terry's childhood background was not what one might expect. Terry's mother and
his two aunts were ardent feminists. At age 16, he dropped out of high school in New
York and left home to become a rock star in Texas. Later, however, he became a
"bom-again" Christian and enrolled in a Bible college. At age 24,he became committed
to the pro-life movement after a church prayer session focusing on abortion as "the
Holocaust in America." At age 28, he founded Operation Rescue. Id.
2

0peration Rescue draws its name from a passage in The Bible: "Rescue those who
are being dragged to death, and from those tottering to execution withdraw not. If you
say, "1 know not this man!" does not he who tests hearts perceive it? He who guards
your life knows it, and he will repay each one according to his deeds." Proverbs 24:11-12.
3

National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760,764 (D.D.C. 1990).

4

Several federal circuit courts have already heard cases involving § 1985(3) and
Operation Rescue blockades. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,
948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990);
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted
sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S.Ct. 1070 (1991); N.Y. State
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947
(1990); Roe v. Abortion Abolition Society, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

848(1987).
542 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
6403 U.S. 88 (1971).
7

Id. at 102.

8

For a list of groups that the lower courts have held as falling or not falling within
the class-based animus requirement of § 1985(3), see JOSEPH G. COOK & JoHN L. SOBIESKI,
CIVIL RIGHTs AcTIoNs § 13.09(A) (1991).
9442 U.S. 366 (1979).
10463 U.S. 825 (1983).
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of § 1985(3), but also left other questions unanswered. Significantly, they failed
to resolve the lower courts' confusion over whether § 1985(3) applies to
classifications other than race, and if so, to what groups it might apply.
It is this confusion that has helped to create the present legal battle over the
applicability of § 1985(3) to the Operation Rescue blockades. The abortion
clinics' position is that the blockades are conspiracies within the meaning of
§ 1985(3) and that they represent a form of class-based (in this instance,
gender-based) invidiously discriminatory animus against women.1 1 Operation
Rescue, on the other hand, argues that it opposes an activity (abortion) and not
a class of persons (women).12 It also argues that it is questionable whether
§ 1985(3)'s class-based discriminatory animus requirement extends beyond
racial groups to include gender-based groups.1 3 This battle between the clinics
and Operation Rescue over the meaning of § 1985(3) may soon be resolved by
Operation Rescue
the Supreme Court. The Court has granted certiorari in an
14
blockade case in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that § 1985(3) is not applicable to
Operation Rescue's blockade activities. Part II provides a brief survey of the
history of § 1985(3) from its roots in the post-Civil War era to the 1950's. Part
III examines the requirements for a § 1985(3) claim as delineated in the Griffin,
Novotny, and Scott decisions. Part IV applies these requirements to the blockade
controversy and argues that: (1) Gender-based animus should be accepted by
the Court as a form of class-based animus within the meaning of § 1985(3); (2)
the blockades do not fall within § 1985(3) because they are not motivated by a
gender-based animus; and (3) the claims against Operation Rescue fail to meet
§ 1985(3)'s requirement of interference with an independently existing right as
established by the Court in Novotny.
II. THE HISTORY OF § 1985(3)
In 1871, in response to increasing acts of violence by the Ku Klux Klan, 15 the
42nd Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act. The Ku Klux Klan Act was one of several pieces of civil rights
legislation enacted by the Reconstruction Congress from 1866-75 to combat
problems related to racial discrimination in the South. 16 Section 2 of the Ku
11E.g., N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1258 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), affd as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).

12 E.g., Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 772 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 n.37 (N.D. Ala. 1991),
affd, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992).
13
E.g., Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258,263-64
(D. Kan. 1991).
14111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991) (granting certiorari).

1SKen Gormley, PrivateConspiraciesand the Constitution: A Modem Vision of 42 U.S.C.
Section 1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 530-31 (1985).
16Four other civil rights acts were pushed through Congress in these years: Act of

May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981-1982 (1982)) (protecting
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Klux Klan Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), provided for civil liability17
for conspiracies "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
''18
privileges and immunities under the laws.
It did not take long, however, for the Supreme Court to dismantle Congress'
grand scheme of federal civil rights protection. A series of Supreme Court
decisions in the fifty years after the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act rendered
it and much of the other federal civil rights legislation passed by the
Reconstruction Congress largely impotent. The Slaughter-HouseCases19 limited

the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to "a small
subset of rights arising from national citizenship, such as the right to travel to

the national capital, the right to sue in federal court, and the right to use the
navigable waters of the United States.' 20 The conspiracy section of the Ku Klux
Klan Act used language that mirrors the Privileges and Immunities Clause of

voting rights); Act of Mar. 1,1875, ch. 114,18 Stat. 335 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1984
(1982)) (prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations); Act of Apr. 9,
1866, ch. 31,14 Stat. 27 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.) (outlawing Black Codes
in the former Confederate states); Act of Feb. 28,1871, ch. 99,16 Stat. 433, repealed by Act
of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25,28 Stat. 36 (protecting voting rights).
17
Section 2 also originally provided for criminal penalties, but this portion of the Act
was held unconstitutional in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882). For further
discussion of the criminal penalty portion of Section 2, see JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L.
SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS § 13.02 (1991).
18

Act of Apr. 20,1871, ch. 22, § 2,17 Stat. 13 (1871). The civil conspiracy portion was
later codified as 8 U.S.C. § 47(3), and, for a short time, as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c). For the
purposes of this Note, it will be referred to in its present form, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The
statute reads, in relevant part:
If two or more persons.., conspire or go in disguise on the highway or
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause
to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
1983 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Slaughter-House Cases involved a constitutional
challenge by a group of butchers to a Louisiana statute which gave one company a
monopoly on cattle slaughtering in parts of Louisiana. The butchers claimed that the
monopoly constituted a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected the butchers' claim, holding that
the butchers' right to carry on a business was not one of the rights of national citizenship
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 78.
20Gormley, supra note 15, at 542.
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Court limited that clause,
the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, to the extent the
21
it also limited the reach of the Ku Klux Klan Act.
Perhaps the biggest blow to the reach of the Ku Klux Klan Act came in United
States v. Harris, 22 where the Court struck down the criminal portion of section 2
of the Act. 23 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give
24
Congress the power to reach purely private acts of mob violence. It could
25
only be invoked where the state itself had participated in the wrongdoing.
Since the civil conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act was phrased in
Fourteenth Amendment language, it too, by implication, would be limited by
this state action requirement. Consequently, the ability of the Act to reach
private conspiracies was rendered practically null and void. This is evidenced
by the fact that from the date the Act was enacted until 1920, not one case
involving the civil conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)) appeared in the Federal Reporter.26 The Supreme Court did not hear
a § 1985(3) case until Collins v. Hardyman27 in 1951. In Collins, the Court made
the state action requirement specifically applicable to § 1985(3).28

2

lid. at 541-42.

22106 U.S. 629 (1883). In Harris,a group of white men took four black men out of a
Tennessee jail and brutally beat them. The whites were indicted under the criminal
conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act, which made it a crime for two or more
persons to conspire to deprive someone of equal privileges and immunities or equal
protection under the laws. The Court held that the criminal conspiracy section of the
Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 640. The Court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment,
from which the language of the criminal conspiracy section was taken, required state
action and provided no protection against the infringement of equal privileges and
immunities or equal protection by private individuals. Id. at 637-40.
23

The criminal portion was codified at that time as Rev. Stat. § 5519 (1875).

24106 U.S. at 637-40.
25

1d. at 638-39.

26
Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate FederalCivil Remedy?, 26
IND. L.J. 361,363 (1951).
27341 U.S. 651 (1951), overruled by Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
28

d. at 661.
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III. GRIFFIN, NOVOTNY, AND SCOTT: THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN
INTERPRETATION OF § 1985(3)

A. Griffin and Novotny
1. The Rebirth of § 1985(3)
In 1971, a century after the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the Court, in
Griffin v. Breckenridge,29 gave new life to § 1985(3). For the first time, the Court
held that § 1985(3) provides a civil remedy for certain privateconspiracies. 30 In
doing so, the Court rejected the state action requirement laid down in Collins
v. Hardyman.31 While not explicitly overturning Collins, the Court concluded
that most of the potential constitutional problems that formed the basis of the
Court's holding in Collins were simply nonexistent. 32 The Collins Court had
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment language of § 1985(3) regarding "equal
protection" and "privileges and immunities" to mean that the statute reached
only conspiracies under color of state law.33 The Griffin Court, however,
examined the historical background and the plain language of the statute and
concluded that "all indicators - text, companion provisions, and legislative
history - point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of private conspiracies." 34
While recognizing the legislative intent of the Reconstruction Congress that
§ 1985(3) was intended to cover private conspiracies, the Court also recognized
Congress' intent that the statute not become a general federal tort law en-

29403 U.S. 88 (1971).
30

1d. at 101.

31341 U.S. at 651.
32403 U.S. at 96. The Collins Court feared that removing the state action requirement
on § 1985(3) would raise serious problems in regard to "congressional power under and
apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the states, the content of
rights derived from national as distinguished from state citizenship, and the question
of separability of the Act in its application to those two classes of rights." 341 U.S. at 659.
33403 U.S. at 92 (interpreting the Court's decision in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S.
651 (1951)).
34Id. at 101. In regard to § 1985(3)'s companion provisions, the Court explained:
There appear to be three possible forms of a state action limitation of § 1985(3)
- that there must be action under color of state law ... interference with or

influence upon state authorities, or... a private conspiracy so massive and
effective that it supplants those authorities and thus satisfies the state
action requirement. The Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
17 Stat. 13, § 2 of which is the parent of § 1985(3), dealt with each of these
three situations in explicit terms in other parts of the same Act.... Given the
existence of these three provisions, it is almost impossible to believe that
Congress intended, in the dissimilar language of the portion of § 1985(3) now
before us, simply to duplicate the coverage of one or more of them.
Id. at 98-99.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/7
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compassing each and every private conspiracy.35 Therefore, the Court culled
from the statute a four-part test for stating a cause of action under § 1985(3). To
make his case, a plaintiff would need to prove:
(1) [A] conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured
of any right or privilege of a
in his person or property or
36 deprived
citizen of the United States.
The Court interpreted the language in part two of the test regarding "equal
protection" and "privileges and immunities" to require a "racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action."3 7 The Court viewed this requirement as giving effect to
the congressional purpose behind part two of the test. This purpose - to limit
the reach of the statute to conspiracies motivated by a class-based animus - was
stated by several congressmen who were sponsors of the limiting amendment
that placed part two of the test into the statute.38 The Court relied on remarks
by Representative Shellabarger, the House sponsor of the bill that contained
what is now § 1985(3):
The object of the amendment is ...to confine the authority of this law
to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of
rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus
and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may
not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens'
39
rights, shall be within the scope of the remedies of this section.
In addition to the four-part test, the Griffin Court established another
requirement for claims under § 1985(3). For a claim to be valid, the trial court
must find that Congress had the constitutional authority to impose liability for
the alleged private conspiratorial conduct. 40 This requirement was later
35

1d. at 102.

36

United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,828-29 (1983) (providing
a refined version of the four-part test from Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03).
37403 U.S. at 102.
381d. at 100, 102. For a more extensive discussion of the congressional debate
surrounding the limiting amendment, see Gormley, supra note 15, at 537-39 (analyzing
the congressional purpose behind the limiting amendment in a manner similar to the
Griffin Court). But see Neil H. Cogan, Section 1985(3)s Restructuringof Equality: An Essay
on Texts, History, Progress, and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERs L. REV. 515, 563-64 (1987)
(disagreeing that the purpose of the limiting amendment was to confine § 1985(3) to
conspiracies with a class-based animus).
39403 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rep. Shellabarger, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 478
(1871)).
40

d. at 103.
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clarified by the Court in Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.2
Novotny,41 a § 1985(3) case involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4
In Novotny, the Court held that § 1985(3) creates no substantive rights itself, but
is purely a remedial statute. It provides "a civil cause of action when some
otherwise defined federal right - to equal protection of the laws or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws - is breached by a conspiracy in the
43
manner defined by the section.
The Griffin Court identified two sources of constitutional authority that
provided a basis for the petitioners' § 1985(3) claim. First, the Court found a

basis for imposing liability for private conduct in the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Court reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits not only state
laws upholding slavery, but also private conduct.4 4 The Court then concluded
that "Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority
to translate that determination into effective legislation."4s
The second source of constitutional authority identified by the Griffin Court
was the right of interstate travel. The Court noted that it is well established that
the right of interstate travel is protected against private interference as well as
interference by the State.4 6 Thus, the Court concluded that it was up to the
petitioners to prove that one of the respondents' intentions was to
discriminatorily interfere with the petitioners' right of interstate travel. Having
proved that, there would be a basis of congressional power by which § 1985(3)
could reach the private conspiratorial conduct. 4 7 Significantly, the Court noted
that by identifying the right of interstate travel and the Thirteenth Amendment
it was not
as valid sources of congressional power for a § 1985(3) claim,
48
implying the absence of other possible sources of that power.
2. The aftermath of Griffin
While the Griffin Court opened up the federal courts to § 1985(3) claims, it
also left some important questions unanswered. In holding that § 1985(3)

41442 U.S. 366 (1979). The petitioner in Novotny was a male bank employee who sued
his employer under both Title VII and § 1985(3). He claimed he was fired for standing
up to his employer's discriminatory practices toward female employees. Id. at 368-69.
The Court held that the deprivation of Title VII rights cannot form the basis for a
§ 1985(3) claim. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would permit plaintiffs to
at 378.
circumvent the detailed administrative provisions of Title VII. Id.
4242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e(17) (1964).
43442 U.S. at 376.
44403 U.S. at 105.
45

1d. (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968)).

46

1d.

47

1d. at 106.

8

4 1d. at 107.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/7
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requires a racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, discriminatory animus behind
the conspiracy, the Court left open the question of whether the statute applied
to classes other than race, and if so, to what classes.4 9 The facts of Griffin were
of no help in answering this question, since the situation in Griffin involved
racial animus and was factually quite similar to the racially motivated Klan
violence that § 1985(3) was originally designed to address. 50
A second question left open by the Court was whether a § 1985(3) claim could
be based on the deprivation of a right that normally is one protected only
against state action. The cause of action in Griffin rested on two rights that are
protected against private as well as state conduct - the Thirteenth Amendment
and the right of interstate travel. It was unclear what would happen if a plaintiff
tried to rest his § 1985(3) claim on the deprivation of, for instance, a Fourteenth
Amendment right, which is protected only against state action. In short, was
there still some form of a state action requirement left, even after Griffin?
B. United Bhd. of Carpenters& Joiners v. Scott
1. Class-Based Animus
In United Bhd. of Carpenters& Joinersv. Scott,51 the Court declined to resolve
the confusion over whether § 1985(3) applies to classifications other than race.
In regard to this issue, the Court stated that "it is a close question whether
§ 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus
against Negroes and those who championed their cause. "52 The Court gave no
clear indication of how it might decide this issue in the future. On the one hand,
the Court recognized that the legislative history of § 1985(3) might seem to

49 For

a more detailed discussion of the confusion among the circuit courts after
Griffin regarding what constitutes a "class" under § 1985(3), see Steven F. Shatz, The
Second Death of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of History in Statutory
Interpretation,27 B.C. L. REV. 911, 918-20 (1986); Gormley, supra note 15, at 550-52.
50
1n Griffin, the petitioners were three blacks who were stopped on a highway in
Mississippi and forced out their car by the respondents, a group of white men. The
whites pointed guns at the blacks and threatened to kill them. They then clubbed the
blackmen brutally, inflicting serious injuries. The motivation (animus) behind the attack
was the mistaken belief that the driver of the car was an out-of state worker for a group
called "Civil Rights for Negroes." 403 U.S. at 88-91.
51463 U.S. 825 (1983). The respondents in Scott were an employer and two of his
non-union employees. The employer, the head of a construction company, had been
threatened with violence several times by union locals and their members. On one
occasion, a protest at the construction site turned into an ugly mob scene. The mob
stormed the site, brutally beating the employer and several of his employees with iron
rods and wooden boards. The mob also set fire to the construction site office and
vandalized company tools and equipment. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979,982-84 (5th Cir.
1982) (en banc), rev'd sub nor. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S.
825(1983).
52463 U.S. at 836.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
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support a broad view of what classes the statute could reach. 53 The Court
acknowledged the words of Senator Edmunds, Senate manager of the bill that
contained what is now § 1985(3), who said if a man were conspired against
"because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or
because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter,.. . then this
section could reach it."54 On the other hand, the Court discounted to some
extent the significance of Senator Edmunds' comments. The Court noted that
the Senate had made only minor technical changes in the bill, and that the
amendment which gave § 1985(3) its class-based animus limitation had
actually been proposed, debated, and adopted in the House.55
While not shedding any light on what forms of class-based animus besides
race might be included in § 1985(3), the Scott Court did make it clear that
"conspiracies motivated by bias toward others on account of their economic
views, status, or activities"56 were not reached by the statute. In denying relief
to the respondents, the Court stated that it could find nothing in the legislative
history to support extending the reach of § 1985(3) to economic or commercial
animus. 57 A four-person dissent, led by Justice Blackmun, disagreed. Based on
certain congressional statements of concern regarding economic animus in the
legislative history of 1985(3), they concluded that economic animus is within
the reach of the statute. 58
2. State Action Requirement
In addition to dealing with the issue of economic animus, the Scott Court
provided an answer to the "state action" question. In Scott, the respondents, a
non-union employer and two of its employees, sought a remedy under
§ 1985(3) by alleging that the petitioners, trade unions and their members,
conspired to deprive them of their First Amendment right to freedom of
association by attacking the employer's non-union workers and vandalizing
company equipment. 59 The Court held that a "conspiracy to infringe First
Amendment rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved that the
State is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to
influence activity of the State."60 The reasoning of the Court took the following
steps: (1)Despite the fact that its language resembles that of the Fourteenth

53

Id.

54

1d. at 837 (quoting Sen. Edmunds, CONG. GLoBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871)).

55Id.
56
1d. at 837.
57463 U.S. at 837-38.
58
1d. at 852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59

1d. at 828-30.

60

1d. at 830.
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Amendment, there is no state action requirement inherent in § 1985(3);61 (2)
§ 1985(3) is purely remedial. Any rights that are protected by 1985(3) must come
from elsewhere; 62 (3) The respondents here allege a conspiracy to deprive them
of their First Amendment rights. The First Amendment is made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides protection only from state action, not from private wrongs done by
individuals; 63 (4) When, as here, the right that the conspiracy allegedly
interfered with is by definition a right that is protected only against state
interference, the claimant is required to prove state involvement in the
conspiracy.6 4
3. The Aftermath of Scott
The Scott decision drew criticism from scholars. Some were critical of the
Court's continuing unwillingness to clarify once and for all the issue of whether
§ 1985(3) extends beyond conspiracies motivated by racial animus. A major
concern was the effect of this lack of clarity on the lower courts, 65 which were
already badly in need of guidance on this issue. 66 Others who wanted to see
§ 1985(3) expanded beyond racial animus questioned the Court's conservative
reading of the statute and its legislative history. One such commentator,
criticizing the Court's conservative analysis, stated:
A Court that does not discuss text, context, or connected statutory text,
that discusses congressional debate with minimal references to that
debate, and that discusses most fervently principles of federalism and
to protect
judicial restraint, such a Court is unlikely to read the statute
67
equality beyond situations of egregious racial conflict.
Some critics, however, thought the Scott Court should have clearly restricted
the scope of § 1985(3) to conspiracies involving racial animus, or at least not
much beyond that. One commentator noted why some might see the need for
such an approach: "[Federal judges seemed to be ignoring the warning of...
[§ 1985 (3)'s] framers against converting the statute into a general federal tort
law ...[and have] found causes of action in such unusual contexts as conspir-

61i.at 832.
62463 U.S. at 833.
63

M. at 831.

64

1d. at 833.
See Shatz, supra note 49, at 926-28 (analyzing post-Scott lower court cases to

65

illustrate the confusion caused by the Scott Court's failure to resolve the class animus
issue); Gormley, supranote 15, at 563-64 (criticizing the Scott Court's failure to guide the
lower courts in determining which classes warrant protection under § 1985(3)).
66

SCe COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 17, at § 13.09(A).

67

Cogan, supra note 38, at 538.
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acies aimed at environmentalists or members of a single family."68 Critics on
both sides of the debate, though, seemed to agree on one thing: The Scott Court
needed to clarify the class animus issue, and it failed to do so.
IV. THE MISUSE OF § 1985(3) AGAINST OPERATION RESCUE

There are two major issues in the debate over the applicability of § 1985(3)
to the Operation Rescue blockades. The first is whether the blockades represent
a form of class-based invidiously discriminatory animus against the class,
"women seeking abortions." The important sub-issues here are: (1) Whether
§ 1985(3) provides protection against conspiracies motivated by a
gender-based animus against women; and (2) if so, whether "women seeking
abortions" qualify as a subset of women; and (3) whether the blockades
represent an animus toward "women seeking abortions" or simply an animus
toward the activity of abortion and the principle that it is moral and legal to
abort an unborn human being. The second major issue in this debate is whether
the claims against Operation Rescue meet the § 1985(3) requirement of
interference with an independently existing right as stated in Great American
FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny.69 The two rights which abortion clinics
typically allege Operation Rescue interferes with are the right to abortion and
right of interstate travel. 70
A. The Blockades: Invidiously DiscriminatoryAnimus Against Women Seeking
Abortions?
1. Section 1985(3) Reaches Gender-Based Animus
Notwithstanding the Scott Court's pronouncement that it is a "close
question"71 whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach class-based animus other
than racial animus, at least eight circuit courts have held that § 1985(3) reaches
gender-based animus. 72 Many district courts have come to the same

68Gormley, supra note 15, at 557 (footnote omitted).
69442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979).
70See, e.g., N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247,1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (plaintiff alleging infringement on the right of travel and the right to abortion),
affd as modied, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
71
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983).
72
See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582,585 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. grantedsub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991);
N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,1359 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 947 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988); Long v. Laramie
County Community College Dist., 840 F.2d 743,751-53 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 825 (1988); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1984); Novotny v. Great
American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf.
Mayer v. Wedgewood Neighborhood Coalition, 707 F.2d 1020,1022 (9th Cir. 1983). But
see Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
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conclusion.73 The justifications these courts have given for the inclusion of
gender-based animus have generally focused on three aspects of § 1985(3): (1)
legislative history; (2) text; and (3) historical context.
The legislative history of § 1985(3) strongly suggests that the 42nd Congress
intended this statute to be interpreted broadly to protect classes other than
racial classes. Several members of Congress made strong statements about the
breadth of classes the statute was meant to cover. The statement most often
quoted by the courts is that of Senator Edmunds, the manager of the bill in the
Senate, who stated that, "If... it should appear that this conspiracy was formed
against this man because he was a Democrat, ... [or] a Catholic, or .. .a
Methodist, or . . . a Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it."74

Representative Shellabarger, who introduced the bill in the House, also argued
for a broad judicial interpretation of § 1985(3). He stated: "This act is remedial,
and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes
and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and
beneficially construed." 75 Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the
specific inclusion of women as a class within § 1985(3) is found in these words
of Representative Buckley: "The proposed legislation . . . is not to protect

Republicans only in their property, liberties, and lives, but Democrats as well,
not the colored only, but the whites also; yes even women...."76
Some courts and commentators find a second argument for the inclusion of
women as a class under § 1985(3) in the plain language of the statute. 77 There
is nothing in the text of the statute itself that would lead one to a restrictive
reading of § 1985(3). Section 1985(3) does not speak in terms of race. Instead, it
uses broad language to describe the people the statute protects. The Second
Circuit took note of this, stating:
The broad language of § 1985(3) does not exclude women from its
protection. It speaks instead of "persons" and "class[es] of persons,"
and seeks to secure to them the "equal protection of the laws" and the
"equal privileges and immunities under the laws."
...Distinctions based upon immutable characteristics such as sex
have long been considered invidiously discriminatory. By its very

73

See, e.g., Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712

F. Supp. 165,169 (D. Or. 1988).

74
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871). The Scott Court, as previously
mentioned, discounted to some extent the importance of Sen. Edmunds' remarks.
However, the Court also noted that "Senator Edmunds' views, since he managed the
bill on the floor of the Senate, are not without weight." 463 U.S. at 837. The Court also
noted that his remarks were the clearest expression in the legislative history of the
broader view of § 1985(3). Id. at 836.
75

CONG. GLOBE App., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871).

76

1d. at 190.

77
See generally Cogan, supra note 38 (outlining a method of reading and interpreting
the text of § 1985(3), its legislative history, and its surrounding statutory texts).
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language § 1985(3) is necessarily tied to evolving notions of equality
and citizenship. As conspiracies directed against women are
inherently invidious, and repugnant to the notion of equality of
78 rights
for all citizens, they are therefore encompassed under the Act.
In light of the plain text of § 1985(3), it is indeed difficult to understand how
the Supreme Court sees it as a "close question" whether § 1985(3)'s protection
extends beyond racial classes. 79
A third factor that has led many courts to conclude that women are protected
as a class under § 1985(3) is the historical context of the statute. As originally
enacted, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was entitled, "An Act to Enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes."80 The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was, like § 1985(3), initially written to ensure equal
treatment of the recently freed slaves. Section 1985(3)'s language concerning
"equal protection" was taken directly from the Fourteenth Amendment. This
led the Sixth Circuit to conclude in Browder v. Tipton,81 that "[t]he distinction
between classes protected by § 1985(3) and those that are unprotected must be
rooted somewhere in traditional equal protection analysis." 82 In 1973 , in

78 N.Y.

State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1989)

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990). The Court went on to state: 'It is...
untenable to believe that Congress would provide a statutory remedy against private
conspiracies, the purpose of which is to deny rights common to every citizen, and
exclude women as a class from the shelter of its protection." Id. at 1359.
79
Cf. Cogan, supra note 38, at 517-18 (arguing that a novice reader of legal texts might
do a better job of interpreting the language of § 1985(3) than the Supreme Court has
done).
80
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).

81630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs in Browder were truck drivers who were
delivering fuel to a Tennesee company that was experiencing labor problems. When the
plaintiffs attempted to cross the picket line in their trucks, an altercation developed
between the plaintiffs and one of the defendants. Later, the defendants appeared before
a county magistrate and falsely accused the plaintiffs of committing serious felonies. As
a result, the plaintiffs were arrested. Subsequently, they filed a § 1985(3) claim against
the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court dismissing the suit. The appellate court explained its decision on the basis
of an equal protection analysis of § 1985(3):
[Tihe class of individuals protected by the "equal protection of the laws"
language of the statute are those so-called "discrete and insular" minorities
that receive special protection under the Equal Protection Clause because of
inherent personal characteristics. The persons protected under the "equal
privileges and immunities" language of the statute are those individuals who
join together as a class for the purpose of asserting certain fundamental rights.
These classes do not include picket line crossers who are falsely arrested.
Id. at 1150.
82
1d. at 1152.
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Frontiero v. Richardson,83 the Supreme Court extended the reach of the Equal
Protection Clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to sex-based
discrimination. 84 Therefore, courts following this "equal protection" analysis
85
of § 1985(3) have concluded that the statute's protection extends to women.
Of course, it can be argued that § 1985(3)'s protection should not be extended
beyond racial classes. There is, after all, no affirmative intent expressed in the
text of § 1985(3) to reach conspiracies based on gender. As stated in Scott, "[t]he
predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against
Negroes and their supporters."86 The name given to § 1985(3) - the Ku Klux
Klan Act - further reinforces the purpose of the statute - to stop Klan violence
in the post-Civil War South. Most courts and commentators, however, have
rejected this narrow interpretation of the statute. They have, instead, concluded
from the text, legislative history, and historical context of § 1985(3) that the
broader'reading of the statute is the more accurate interpretation.
2. "Women Seeking Abortions" Not a Gender-Based Class
To conclude that § 1985(3) affords protection against conspiracies motivated

by an invidiously discriminatory animus against women, however, is not to
conclude that § 1985(3) protects the subset of women, "women seeking
abortions." Some courts have reasoned that there is no difference betwen these
two classes. Therefore, they have concluded that Operation Rescue's blockades
are class-based conspiracies against women seeking abortions within the
meaning of § 1985(3).87 But there are two major flaws with this conclusion.
83411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero,the petitioner was a woman officer in the Air Force
who was denied additional health and living allowance benefits for her husband. Under
the prevailing laws, female spouses automatically qualified for these benefits. A male
spouse of a female member of the armed forces, however, had to prove he was
dependent on his wife for over one-half of his support in order to receive these benefits.
The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of these laws. The Frontiero Court
employed an "equal protection" analysis and concluded that "classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court found the statutory scheme unconstitutional.
84

1d. at 688.

85

See, e.g., Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218,224 (6th
Cir. 1991).
86
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983).
87
Most of the courts that have held that "women seeking abortions" is a class under
§ 1985(3) have done so on the basis of some form of Equal Protection Clause analysis.
See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218,224 (6th Cir. 1991);
N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church,
765 F. Supp. 617, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v.
Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or. 1988). The clearest statement of
this viewpoint is found in Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. The court responded to the
defendant's argument that since their blockade affected only women seeking abortions,
and not women generally, § 1985(3) was not applicable:
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First, it is very questionable whether "women seeking abortions" is truly a class
protected by § 1985(3). Second, even if "women seeking abortions" is a § 1985(3)
class, the activities of the blockaders are not motivated by an invidiously
discriminatory animus against this class. Therefore, the blockades do not fall
within the ambit of § 1985(3).
A number of courts have refused to recognize "women seeking abortions" as
89
a § 1985(3) class. 88 In NationalAbortion Federationv. OperationRescue, the court
indicated its difficulty with accepting "women seeking abortions" as a § 1985(3)
class:
[I]f the animus is directed at a particular class of women, then, by
definition, it is not directed at... women as a class. If that is so, then
the discrimination cannot be gender-based, because it separates
gender from each other and, obviously, on a basis
persons of the same
90
other than gender.
The court held that "women seeking abortions" is not a protected class under
1985(3).91
Another problem with recognizing "women seeking abortions" as a class is
that it is not truly a class. Rather, it is an activity - abortion - dressed up as a

One of the primary purposes of § 1985(3), like that of the Equal Protection
Clause, is not simply to accord an intangible, abstract protection to the targeted
class, but to protect members of the class in the exercise of their individual
rights.... A statute that disenfranchised African Americans would be no less
a deprivation of equal protection of the laws simply because it was intended
to affect only that class of African Americans who wish to vote. Virtually any
conduct that violates equal protection under § 1985(3) can be characterized
as impacting only those members of the class seeking to exercise the predicate Statutory or constitutional right.... To the extent that the defendant's
conduct limits the ability of women to secure an abortion, it trenches upon the
rights of all women.
Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc., 948 F.2d 218, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit's
comparison of Operation Rescue's activities with opposition to blacks seeking to vote
is flawed. Opposition to black voters is based on race. People who oppose the idea of
blacks voting do so because the voters are black. They do not oppose the activity of
voting itself. In the case of Operation Rescue, however, the opposition is solely to the
activity of abortion.
88
See Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir.
1989); National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (C.D. Cal.
1989); cf. Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 772 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 n.37 (N.D. Ala. 1991)
(stating that while it was not necessary to decide the class animus issue to resolve the
case before it, the court found no animus directed at women as a group by the Operation
Rescue blockade), affd, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992).
89
90
91

National Abortion Fed'n, 721 F. Supp. at 1171.
1d.
1d. at 1171-72.
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class. 92 The class of "women seeking abortions" has the same fatal flaw as did
the class rejected in Scott:
This class ... is not a "class" marked by historical oppression, by
minority status,... by any political or religious belief, or by any of the
indicia usually used to identify a class of persons who must be
accorded special protection. The animus here was not directed at the
membership of the plaintiffs in such a class or at their association
together.. . but at their activities. 9
The class rejected in Scott was "workers who refused to join a union."94 That
class is similar to "women seeking abortions" in that it is defined by a common
desire to exercise a legal right rather than by an immutable characteristic, such
as race. To allow such a class to invoke the protection of § 1985(3) would turn
the class-based animus requirement into a contest of artful pleading. To bring
one's self within § 1985(3), one would merely have to define herself, for
instance, as a "woman seeking 'x" or a "black person seeking 'y'." The
possibilities would be limitless. Contrary to the expressed intentions of the
Congress that enacted it, § 1985(3) would become a "general federal tort law."95
3. Blockaders' Animus Against Abortion, Not Against Women
Even if one accepts "women seeking abortions" as a class under § 1985(3),
Operation Rescue's blockades do not represent a form of invidiously
discriminatory animus directed at this class. As the Alabama District Court
noted in Lucero v. OperationRescue,96 the animus of the blockades is not against
the women seeking the abortions, but "against the principle that it is morally
and legally right to abort a fetus." 97 Operation Rescue does not target the
women. Rather, it targets the practice of abortion. During a blockade, the
rescuers bar access to the clinic to everyone involved in the abortion process staff, doctors, nurses, and women seeking abortions and their companions.9 8
Thus, it is a mischaracterization of the blockades to describe them as motivated
92

Contra N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359-60 (2d Cir.
1989) (rejecting blockaders' argument that "women seeking abortions" is an activity, not
a class), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
93
Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 1018 (5th Cir. 1982) (dissenting opinion), rev'd sub
nom. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
94
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983).
95Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
96772 F.Supp. 1193 (N.D. Ala. 1991), aftd, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992).
97

1d. at 1202 n.37. ContraPlanned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church,
765 F. Supp. 617,623 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (rejecting the argument that the blockades merely
represent opposition to abortion).
98
But see Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258, 264
(D. Kan. 1991) (finding irrelevant the fact that OperationRescue prevents everyone from
entering the clinic).
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by an animus against women seeking abortions. Indeed, the very creation of
the class, "women seeking abortions," represents an attempt to mischaracterize
the opposition to an activity as opposition to a class of persons. 99
There is little question that Operation Rescue's activities have an impact on
the women who go to the clinics on the days they are blockaded. 100 However,
even assuming that "women seeking abortions" is a protected class under
§ 1985(3), "impact" is not enough to establish an invidiously discriminatory
animus. The legislative history of § 1985(3) and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court in Scott make it clear that the essential element of a § 1985(3)
claim is the presence of an invidiously discriminatory animus. 10 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took note of this: "[T]he legislative history [of
§ 1985(3)] indicates that Congress wanted to evaluate "class-based invidious
discrimination" through the lens of "animus or motivation, not impact."102
Unfortunately, some courts have ignored or misunderstood this important
requirement of § 1985(3) in the context of the blockade cases. As a result, they
have granted remedies 103 to abortion clinics under § 1985(3) simply on the
99 Cf. Mississippi

Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir.
1989) (describing a class very similar to "women seeking abortions" as so
under-inclusive as to mischaracterize the debate between the pro-life protestors and the
clinic).
100See, e.g., National
Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir.
1990) (describing some of the possible physical consequences to the women whose
appointments with an abortion clinic were delayed because of a blockade), cert. granted
sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
101United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,834-35 (1983).
102Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic,886 F.2d at 794.
103
The most common remedy used by the courts has been the granting of injunctive
relief to dissuade the blockaders from repeating their activities. See, e.g., National Org.
for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (E.D. Va. 1989) ("Operation

Rescue, its officers, members,. . . and any persons acting in active concert ... with it are
ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from . . . trespassing on, blockading, impeding or

obstructing access to or egress from any facility at which abortions, family planning, or
gynecological services are provided....") (emphasis in original), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. grantedsub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct.
1070 (1991).
For the most part, courts have been careful to limit these injunctions in order to
allow Operation Rescue to continue to carry on legitimate First Amendment activities
outside the clinics, such as protesting and sidewalk counseling. In National Org. for
Women, the court responded negatively to a request by the plaintiffs to grant extremely
restrictive injunctive relief against Operation Rescue:
Plaintiffs' request is... overbroad in seeking to enjoin those "rescue" activities that tend to intimidate, harass, or disturb patients or potential patients
of the clinics. Defendants have a significant First Amendment right to express
their views on the vitally important issue of abortion and nothing in the permanent injunction should be construed to limit that right. Defendants' First
Amendment right to express their own views cannot be curtailed or limited
because some persons are timid or reluctant to hear expressions of defendants'
views on the issue of abortion.
Id. at 1497.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/7

18

OPERATION RESCUE BLOCKADES

19931

basis of impact, without requiring any true showing of a class-based
discriminatory animus on the part of the blockaders.
B. The Independently Existing Right Requirement
In addition to requiring class-based animus, the Supreme Court has held that
§ 1985(3) requires the deprivation of an independently existing right. Section
1985(3) itself provides no substantive rights. 10 4 Rather, "[tihe rights, privileges,
and immunities that § 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere.' 10 5 Thus,
to state a valid claim under § 1985(3), an abortion clinic must allege the
1° 6
deprivation of some independently existing right by the blockaders.
Consistently, the clinics in the blockade cases have alleged the deprivation of
one or both of two rights: The right to abortion and the right of interstate travel.
1. The Right to Abortion
There is both agreement and disagreement in the lower courts regarding the
deprivation of the right to abortion by Operation Rescue. Nearly all of the
courts considering the question agree that since the right to abortion is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the deprivation
of that right requires state action or involvement. 107 The courts here are simply
following the lead of the Supreme Court. In Scott, the Court held that § 1985(3)
does not contain a state action requirement. 1°8 However, the Court also held
that when a § 1985(3) conspiracy is aimed at a right which is by definition only
a right against state interference, such as a Fourteenth Amendment right, the
plaintiff needs to show state action or involvement in the conspiracy. 109 The
disagreement in the lower courts revolves around whether in fact the blockades

Similarly, in Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (5th

Cir. 1989), the court refused a request by an abortion clinic to grant an injunction "to
prevent the protestors from approaching within 500 feet of the clinic and to control the
language employed in theirpro tests, forbidding the use of such terms as "kill," "murder,"
and "butcher." Id. at 790. Weighing the plaintiffs' rights against the defendants' First
Amendment rights, the court concluded: 'The Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence tilts the scale... decisively in favor of the protestors." Id. at 796.
104Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,377 (1979).
105463 U.S. at 833.
106
The Supreme Court has not yet answered the question of what all of the permissible
sources of such a right might be. It is clear that the deprivation of a federal constitutional
right is enough to validate a § 1985(3) claim. However, in Scott, the Court declined to
consider the issue of whether a conspiracy to deprive someone of her rights, privileges,
and immunities under state law might be enough to sustain a § 1985(3) claim. Id. at
833-34.

107See, e.g., Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258,265
(D. Kan. 1991).
108463 U.S. at 832.
109 d. at 833.
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involve state action to a degree sufficient to justify allowing the clinics to invoke
§ 1985(3).
Only a few district courts (and no circuit courts) have held that Operation
Rescue blockades involve state action sufficient to interfere with the right to
abortion under § 1985(3).1 10 The rationale given for finding sufficient state
action varied in each of these cases. In New York State National Organizationfor
Women v. Terry,1 "1the court stated that the mere refusal of the blockaders "to
notify the police of their next target112 .. satisfies § 1985(3)'s requirement for
state involvement. 113 A district court in Kansas took an even more extreme
position. In Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 114 the court held
that to show state action, the plaintiff need not even prove that state actors were
involved in the conspiracy. According to the court, the state action requirement
could be met even when the State only "unwillingly or unwittingly .. .
further[ed] the ends of the conspiracy."115 This very loose interpretation of the
state action requirement, however, has been rejected by most of the courts that
116
have dealt with this issue.
110 See Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 792 F. Supp. 161,166 (M.D. Tenn.
1992); Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258,265-66 (D.
Kan. 1991); N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), affd as modied, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990);
Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165,
168 (D. Or. 1988).
111704 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S.947 (1990).

l12Operation Rescue goes to great lengths to keep secret the location of the clinics it
plans to blockade. If thepolice knew the location beforehand, they could arrange to have
a large number of police officers there to quickly arrest the blockaders. If an abortion
clinic finds outin advance that it is going to be blockaded, it will often simply shut down
that day and reschedule all of its appointments for another day. Or, alternatively, a clinic
might marshall pro-choice forces in an effort to hinder the blockade.
Consequently, Operation Rescue has developed several techniques to ensure that
the clinics and the police do not learn the location of the blockade ahead of time. For
instance, Operation Rescue makes appointments at various clinics, relying on
cancellations to tell them which clinics are closing that day. The blockaders themselves
are not informed of the location ahead of time. They normally meet in a parking lot and
then proceed in a car and bus caravan to whatever clinic their leaders have chosen to
blockade. Operation Rescue also scouts several clinic sites beforehand to make
preparations and to keep the clinics guessing. Carry Wills, Save the Babies, TIME, May 1,
1989, at 26.
113N.Y. State Nat'l Org.for Women, 704 F. Supp. at 1260. On appeal, the circuit court
found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. Instead, they affirmed on the basis of
deprivation of the right of travel. N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d
1339,1361 (2d. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
114773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan. 1991).
115

1d. at 265.

16

1 Some courts, presumably viewing this as a fairly simple issue, have just stated
matter-of-factly, with little or no analysis, that the blockades do not involve state action
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/7
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The problem with this loose interpretation is that it ignores the important
11 7 In
precedent set down by the Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.
Lugar, the Court held that conduct alleged to have caused a deprivation of
Fourteenth Amendment rights must be "fairly attributable to the State." 118 The
Court then set down a two-part test for determining "fair attribution":
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible ... Second, the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly
be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from
state officials,
or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
119
State.
The second part of this test reveals the problem with the loose interpretation
of the state action requirement by the courts in New York State National
Organizationfor Women and Women's Health Care Services. It is indeed dificult to
see how failing to notify the police of future blockade locations or unwilling
and unwitting police conduct could be construed as falling within the Supreme
Court's requirement of state action by someone who may "fairly be said to be
120
a state actor.1
The lower courts that have applied the Lugar "fair attribution" test for state
action to Operation Rescue have concluded that the blockades do not constitute
state action. 121 For example, in Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation
Rescue,122 the Sixth Circuit dealt with a fairly typical blockade. As usual,
Operation Rescue blocked access to the clinic and forced the police to go
through the laborious process of physically removing the "rescuers"
one-by-one and charging each of them with criminal trespass. 123 The plaintiff
clinic alleged that this process involved state action sufficient to satisfy
§ 1985(3).124 The court disagreed. While acknowledging that part of the

and therefore do not infringe on the right to abortion. See, e.g., Lucero v. Operation
Rescue, 772 F.Supp. 1193,1205 (N.D. Ala. 1991), affd, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992).
117457 U.S. 922 (1982).

l18d. at 937. Accord Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).
119457 U.S. at 937.
120

d.

121See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218,227 (6th Cir.
1991); Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, No. C86-161(v)D, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16325, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 1988).

122948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991).
123
1d. at 227.
124
1d. at 220.
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blockaders' intent may well have been to overwhelm the ability of the local
police to protect the patients' ability to enter the clinic for abortions, the court
held that this was "insufficient to show a nexus between the state and the
defendants. " 125 Using the Lugar test, the court concluded: "The protestors were
neither acting under state authority, nor was the state in any sense "responsible"
for their conduct at the clinic. Nor do we find any basis... for charging the
" 126
defendant's actions to the state.
In FeministWomen's Health Center v. Roberts,12 7 the court was faced with a fact
situation similar to that in Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. Here, too, the court
found that the state action requirement, as expressed in Lugar, was not met.128
Significantly, the court pointed out that it is not enough to show that a blockade
had an impact or an effect on the State.1 29 Instead, under Lugar, plaintiffs must
show that the acts violating their rights are fairly attributable to some state
actor.130
If the Lugar test is properly applied by the courts, clinics will rarely be able
to show state action sufficient to prove that the right to abortion is being
infringed upon under § 1985(3). Indeed, most clinics suing Operation Rescue
recognize the difficulty of Winning on this issue. 13 1 Therefore, in addition to
125Id.
126

1d. at 227.
127 No. C86-161(V)D, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16325 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 1988).
128

1d. at *9.

129
The plaintiff clinic made the following allegations in regard to the effect of the
blockade on the local government: The police department would not allow off-duty
officers to work as security guards for the clinic; the city adopted a neutral policy
regarding the blockade situation; and the police failed to prosecute certain trespassers
and makers of harassing phone calls. Id. at *8.
130
Id. at *9.

131One issue that has arisen in many of the blockade cases is whether the clinics have
standing to sue Operation Rescue on behalf of their patients. Almost all of the courts
faced with this issue have answered in the affirmative. See Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919
F.2d 857,864-65 (3d Cir. 1990); N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339,
1346-48 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); National Org. for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760, 762 (D.D.C. 1990); National Org. for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070
(1991); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp 426, 428 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
In general, these courts have relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). In Singleton, the Court held that physicians had standing
to challenge a Missouri law excluding from Medicaid funding for all abortions except
for those judged "medically indicated." Id. at 108-09. Ordinarily, one may not claim
standing to assert the constitutional rights of someone else. McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420,429 (1961). In Singleton, however, the Courtheld that physicians could establish
standing to sue on behalf of their patients if they could overcome two barriers. First, the
physicians must allege an adequate "injury in fact." 428 U.S. at 112. Second, the
physicians must show that, based on prudential considerations, they could properly
assert not only their own legal rights, but also those of their patients. Id. at 113-15.
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alleging the deprivation of the right to abortion under § 1985(3), they usually
also allege the infringement of a right that does not require a showing of state
action. Typically, they allege that Operation Rescue is infringing on the right of
132
interstate travel.

2. The Right of Interstate Travel
In Griffin v. Breckenridge,133 the Supreme Court "opened the door for

litigants"134 to base their § 1985(3) claims on the interference with the right of
interstate travel. The Griffin Court stated that the right of interstate travel "does

Most of the courts that have applied Singleton in the context of the blockades have
concluded that these two barriers were sufficiently overcome by the clinics. Thus, they
have permitted the clinics to sue Operation Rescue on behalf of their patients. For
example, in N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women, the court found that the "injury in fact"
barrier was overcome by the clinics' allegations that Operation Rescue had completely
blockaded their facilities and interfered with their business. 866 F.2d at 1347-48. In
regard to the second barrier, the court stated that it was proper for the clinics to assert
their patients' rights to abortion and interstate travel, since"the enjoyment of those rights
is 'inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue."' Id. at 1348
(quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114).
Another issue present in the blockade cases is the question of whether associations
such as the National Organization for Women and the National Abortion Rights Action
League have standing to sue Operation Rescue on behalf of their members. As with the
clinics, most of the courts addressing the issue have found that these organizations do
have standing to sue Operation Rescue. See Roe, 919 F.2d at 865-66; N.Y. State Nat'l Org.
for Women, 886 F.2d at 1348-49; National Org.for Women, 747 F. Supp. at 763. All of these
courts found that these organizations met the requirements of associational standing
set down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977):
[An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of-its members when:
(a) Its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose;
and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Id. at 343. For a detailed analysis of these requirements as applied to an organization
seeking standing to sue Operation Rescue, see Roe, 919 F.2d at 865-66.
132

See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218,226 (6th Cir.
1991); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991);
Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 792 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1992);
Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 772 F. Supp. 1193,1205 (N.D. Ala. 1991), affd, 954 F.2d 624
(11th Cir. 1992); Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258,
266 (D. Kan. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765
F.Supp. 617,624 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426,429 (N.D.N.Y. 1989);
N.Y. State Natl Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247,1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd
as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
133403 U.S. 88 (1971).
134 Lucero, 772 F. Supp. at 1200.
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not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment,1 35 and is assertable against
private as well as governmental interference." 136 Therefore, the Court held, a
§ 1985(3) plaintiff who alleges a defendant conspired to interfere with his right
to interstate travel need not show the state was involved in the conspiracy.
Through the right of interstate travel - and through other rights which do not

require a showing of interference by a state actor - § 1985(3) could reach purely
137

private conspiracies.
Abortion clinics eventually learned from the Griffin decision and began to

allege in their complaints that the blockades were private conspiracies to
interfere with their patients' right of interstate travel. 13 8 Clinics with a
significant number of clients from out of state argued that the blockades, by

preventing these clients from gaining entrance to the clinics, were interfering
with the right of interstate travel. 139 Some courts have accepted this argument
and have granted relief to clinics under
14 1
rejected this argument.

§ 1985(3),140 while other courts have

13 5

The Supreme Court of the United States has shown a reluctance to definitively
locate the right of interstate travel in any one particular constitutional provision. Over
the years, the Court has identified many possible sources of the right of interstate travel,
including: the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, see Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55,60 n.6 (1982); the Commerce Clause, see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
173 (1941); and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116,125 (1958).
Most often, however, the Court has located the right of interstate travel in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200
(1973); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); Travis v. Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79-80 (1920); Chalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern
Railway Co., 249 U.S. 522, 526 (1919). For a more detailed discussion of the right of
interstate travel, see generally United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,764-70 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (surveying the various possible constitutional sources of the right of
interstate travel).
136403 U.S. at 105.
1371d. at 105-07.
138 For a partial list of cases in which clinics alleged interference with the right of
interstate travel, see Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1990); N.Y.
State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1346-48 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 947 (1990); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760,
762 (D.D.C. 1990); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483,
1491 (E.D. Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp
426, 428 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
13 9

See, e.g., Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773 F. Supp. 258,
266-67 (D. Kan. 1991).
14OSee, e.g., Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 712
F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Or. 1988).
141 See, e.g., Lucero v. Operation Rescue, 772 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Ala. 1991), affd,
954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Most of the courts that have accepted the clinics' interstate travel argument
have done so on the basis of a questionable interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Doe v. Bolton. 142 In Doe, the Court held that a residency
requirement in a state law regulating abortion violated the right of interstate
travel. The residency requirement provided that one had to be a Georgia
resident to obtain an abortion in Georgia. 143 The courts which have held that
the blockades violate the right of interstate travel generally interpret Doe to
stand for the proposition that anything that impairs the right of nonresident
women to an abortion violates the right of interstate travel. 144 These courts
appear to be drawing this interpretation from the statement by the Doe Court
that the right of interstate travel "protects person[s] who enter... [a state]
" 145
seeking the medical services that are available there.
The problem with this interpretation is that it ignores the rationale of Doe, as
stated in the next sentence of the opinion: "A contrary holding would mean
that a State could limit to its own residents the general medical care available
within its own borders. '146 Thus, Doe simply holds that nonresidents may not
be denied access to medical care to which residents have access. The Court in
Doe was concerned with discrimination between residents and nonresidents
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.147 The Operation
Rescue blockades present no such problem of discrimination. They block access
to residents and nonresidents alike. Therefore, under the rationale of Doe, they
do not violate the right of interstate travel. 148

142410 U.S. 179 (1973).
143

1d. at 200.
See N.Y. State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue, 773
F. Supp. 258, 266-67 (D. Kan. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Holy Angels Catholic
Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 624 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 429
(N.D.N.Y. 1989).
145410 U.S. at 200.
144

146

1d.

147

1d.

48

1 The rationale expressed by the Doe Court for the right of interstate travel - the
prevention of discrimination between residents and nonresidents - has been stated by
the Court on several occasions. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,60 n.6 (1982) (the right
of interstate travel "protects new residents of a state from being disadvantaged ... or
from otherwise being treated differently from longer term residents."); Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974) ("[t]he right of interstate travel
must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital government benefits and
privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents.");
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (stating the right of interstate travel means
that "a citizen of State A who ventures into State B [has] the same privileges which the
citizens of State B enjoy."); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,511 (1939)
(holding the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV "prevents a State from
discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of its own.").
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Another reason that the blockades do not violate the right of interstate travel
is that the blockades do not have as their purpose the interference with the right
of interstate travel. In United States v. Guest,14 9 the Supreme Court upheld an
indictment alleging a private conspiracy to interfere with the right of interstate
travel in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241150 (the criminal analogue of § 1985(3)). In
Guest, the Court emphasized that the conspiracy must be aimed at interfering
with interstate travel, and must not just have coincidentally interfered with the
movement of nonresidents:
Thus, for example, a conspiracy to rob an interstate traveler would not,
of itself, violate § 241. But if the predominantpurpose of the conspiracy
is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or
to oppress a person because of his exercise of that right1 then.., the
conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law.15
In Griffin v. Breckenridge,152 a case involving allegations of a § 1985(3)
conspiracy, the Court again stressed the need for proof that the purpose and
intent of the conspiracy is to interfere with the right of interstate travel. The
Griffin Court stated that plaintiffs must prove that "their right to travel
interstate was one of the rights meant to be discriminatorily impaired by the
conspiracy, that the conspirators intended to drive out-of-state... [persons]
from the State, or that they meant to deter petitioners from associating with
such persons. 153
The purpose of Operation Rescue is to prevent any abortions from taking
place in the clinics on the days they are blockaded. The fact that some
out-of-state persons happen to be prevented from entering the clinics on those
days is purely coincidental. It does not by any stretch of the imagination reflect
the "predominant purpose" or "intent" of the blockades, as required by Griffin
and Guest. Therefore, the blockades do not interfere with the right of interstate
travel.

For a more extensive discussion of the right of interstate travel and its rationale of
preventing discrimination between residents and nonresidents, see generally Note, State
Parochialism,the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1557 (1989).
149383 U.S. 745 (1966).
15018 U.S.C. § 241 made it a federal crime for "two or more persons [to] conspire to
injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of
any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or because of his having so exercised the same."
151383 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).
152403 U.S. 88 (1971).
153Id. at 106.
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V. CONCLUSION

The history of § 1985(3) and its subsequent interpretation by the Supreme
Court in Griffin, Novotny, and Scott lead to the conclusion that the statute is not
applicable to the Operation Rescue blockades. The Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause language placed in § 1985(3) by the 42nd Congress
suggests that the statute should be expanded to include conspiracies with a
gender-based animus. But the blockades are not about discrimination against
women as a class. They are about opposition to abortion. They are, in the eyes
of the "rescuers," about issues of life and death, not issues of gender.
Additionally, the clinics fail to meet the § 1985(3) requirement of an
independently existing right as laid down in Novotny and Scott. The clinics'
claims should not be able to rest on the right to abortion. This right is protected
only against state action, not against civil disobedience by private individuals.
Neither can the clinics' claims rest on the right of interstate travel, since the
blockaders do not discriminate between residents and nonresidents. Nor do
the blockades have the predominant purpose or intent to interfere with the
right of interstate travel, as required by Griffin and Guest. Just as the blockades
are not about gender discrimination, they are also not about interstate travel.
It is ironic that Operation Rescue, a group similar in many ways to the
Underground Railroad, 154 should be attacked under a statute originally
designed to free black people from the remaining vestiges of slavery.155 Like
Harriet Tubman and the others who ran the Underground Railroad, the
"rescuers" break the law to protect the rights of those whom the law does not
recognize as persons; they are criticized for their methods and are accused of
trampling on the rights of others; they are branded as zealots because some of
them are motivated by their religious faith; they are criticized for not respecting
another's right to choose to engage in perfectly legal conduct. One may
certainly disagree with the goals or the tactics of Operation Rescue, just as
people once found fault with those of the Underground Railroad. But
Operation Rescue is no more motivated by an animus against women than
Harriet Tubman and the Underground Railroad were motivated by an animus
154 Randall Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue, has stated: 'The rescue movement
... takes inspiration from ...examples of peaceful civil disobedience, such as the
Underground Railroad before the Civil War." Randall Terry, Operation Rescue, the Civil
Rights Movement of the Nineties, POLICY REVIEW, Winter 1989, at 82. Terry also cites Calvin
Fairbanks as a personal hero. Fairbanks was a member of the Underground Railroad
who served five years in prison for helping slaves flee to Canada. After his release, he
immediately went back to rescuing slaves, was caught again, and was given a 15 year
sentence. He was eventually pardoned and released just before the end of the Civil War.

Id.
15SSome have also compared the Operation Rescue blockades to the lunch counter
sit-ins by blacks in the South in the 1960's. There are problems with this analogy,
however, since the blacks were standing up for their own civil rights, whereas the
"rescuers" are standing up for the civil rights of someone else - the unborn child. There
is also little question that the impact of the blockades on the clinics and their patients is
much greater than the impact of the blacks on the restaurants and their patrons.
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against white people. Employing the logic of the courts that have found the
Operation Rescue blockades in violation of § 1985(3), Harriet Tubman would
be in violation of the statute for engaging'in a conspiracy with a class-based
invidiously discriminatory animus against "whites seeking to keep slaves." The
absurdity of the image of Harriet Tubman being held in violation of a civil rights
statute reinforces the notion that certain courts, in applying § 1985(3) to
Operation Rescue, have taken the statute far beyond where its framers intended
it to go. The Operation Rescue blockades simply do not represent the sort of
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus that § 1985(3) was designed to
punish.
VI. EPILOGUE

On January 13, 1993, the Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of
§ 1985(3) to an Operation Rescue blockade. In Brayv. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic,1 6 the Court held that § 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of action
against the blockades. 157
While the Court again declined to answer the general question of whether
§ 1985(3) applies to classes beyond race, 158 the Court did provide answers to
several more specific questions regarding the use of § 1985(3) against groups
like Operation Rescue. The Court ruled, inter alia, that:
1. "Women seeking abortions" does not qualify as a class under
§ 1985(3);159
2. Even if women were a protected class under § 1985(3),
Operation Rescue's blockades represent an opposition to an
160
activity (abortion), not an animus toward women as a class;
and

156113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
1571d.

at 768.
at 759.
1591d. The Court
reasoned that
158 1d.

Id.

the term ["class"] unquestionably connotes something more than a group
of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3)
defendant disfavors. Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able
to assert causes of action under § 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved
class as those seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered
with.

160
d. at 759-62. "Whetherone agrees or disagrees with thegoal of preventing abortion,
thatgoal in itself... does not remotely qualify for such harsh description [as representing
an invidiously discriminatory animus], and for such derogatory association with
racism." Id. at 762.
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1993]
3.

The clinic's 1985(3) claim failed to meet 1985(3)'s
requirementof an independently existing right under162either
16 1 or the right of interstate travel.
the right to abortion
MICHAEL F. O'BRIEN

161113 S.Ct. at 764. Essentially, the Court concluded that the right to abortion requires
interference by a state actor, and is not protected against purely private conspiracies like
Operation Rescue. Id.
162
Id. at 762-63. According to the Court, the clinic failed to show, as required by United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,760 (1966), that the "predominant purpose" of the blockade
conspiracy was to impede the right of interstate travel. Id. at 762-63.
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